Research
Research
Survey Measures of Democratic Attitudes and Social Desirability Bias. 2025
Political Science Research and Methods [forthcoming], with Pedro C. Magalhães
Research on citizens' support for democracy predominantly relies on surveys. However, the possibility of social desirability biases (SDB) raises questions about their ability to capture the sincere attitudes of citizens toward democracy. We search for evidence of SDB in survey measures of democratic attitudes in three studies. The first two leverage variations in survey mode (self-completion vs. face-to-face) in the European Social Survey's democracy module, taking advantage of the well-established finding that interviewer absence facilitates the expression of less socially desirable opinions. The third study uses a double-list experiment to estimate the prevalence of an anti-democratic attitude. Across all studies, using data from as many as 24 European countries, we find no evidence that SDB inflates survey measures of democratic attitudes. These results significantly impact our understanding of democratic attitudes and the methodological toolkit for interested scholars.
Correcting misperceptions of partisan opponents is not effective at treating democratic ills. 2024,
PNAS Nexus 3(8): 1-9, with Nicholas C. Dias, Kristian V. S. Frederiksen, Yphtach Lelkes, Lea Pradella, and Sean J. Westwood
Many warn that the United States is on the brink of democratic collapse, because partisan animosity, support for partisan violence, and support for undemocratic practices are on the rise. Quelling some fears, scholars have offered interventions that use messages to correct misperceptions about citizens' partisan opponents (the ``out-party''). In this paper, we provide evidence that the effects of these interventions are not as robust or consistent as hoped. First, we use panel data (n = 9,810) to show that perceptions of the out-party are highly variable. This suggests that these perceptions are weakly held and thus unlikely to be a significant cause of hostile attitudes. The oscillation of perceptions over time also suggests that, for many, any effect of corrections would likely be overwhelmed in just one month. Second, in a meta-analysis of 67 statistical tests from 12 studies in eight papers, we document that current evidence on the efficacy of corrections is weak. Third and finally, in pre-registered experiments (n = 2,845), we find that changing Americans’ perceptions of the out-party's demographics, policy attitudes, and support for undemocratic practices has no consistent effect on partisan animosity, support for partisan violence, or support for undemocratic practices. These observations suggest that correcting misperceptions of the out-party is not a panacea for our democratic ills.
Link to paper here.
Does Election Fraud Erode Support for Autocrats? 2023.
Comparative Political Studies 57(12): 1978-2010
Does election fraud erode support for dictators? An original survey experiment from Russia following the 2020 vote on constitutional amendments reveals three key findings. First, regime supporters and opponents differ significantly in their baseline beliefs about election fairness. While regime opponents are already aware of fraud, supporters expect relatively fair elections. Consequently, only regime supporters revise their election beliefs when exposed to fraud information. Second, fraud revelations reduce regime legitimacy beliefs, but only among the regime’s political base. In contrast, regime opponents already perceive the regime as illegitimate at the baseline. Third, the experiment shows minimal, if any, effects on attitudes toward Putin. While fraud revelations cause regime supporters to adjust their views on the regime, their opinions about Putin remain largely unaffected. The findings imply that dictators can maintain popular support among their political base while manipulating elections, posing questions about the potential of fraud to undermine regime stability.
Link to paper here.
Expanding vaccination coverage in conflict regions is crucial to the prevention of further mutations and outbreaks of COVID-19, as well as of future pandemics, worldwide. However, scholars’ suppositions that low levels of trust and control over the flow of misinformation in these regions may necessitate tailored solutions—in particular, that health advice come from trusted non-state authorities—remain largely untested. To better understand the levels and drivers of COVID-19 vaccine receptivity in conflict regions, we partnered with the United Nations and the Somali Ministry of Justice to field a three-wave panel survey (N1 = 1672; N2 = 880; N3 = 908) and vaccine endorsement experiment in South Central Somalia. We observe high overall demand for vaccines (between 90 and 94%), particularly among those who have experienced violence and illness, who perceive high economic disruption due to the pandemic, and who report more favorable views of and exposure to the West and Western-affiliated organizations. The high overall demand is particularly striking given respondents’ low interpersonal trust and considerable exposure to vaccine disinformation. Contrary to scholars’ and policymakers’ expectations, we find that whereas endorsements from government health authorities increase vaccine receptivity, endorsements from non-state customary authorities and extremist militant group Al-Shabaab decrease support for vaccination (−8 and −16% points, respectively). Our findings caution against presupposing a need for different approaches to increasing vaccination coverage in conflict regions, and suggest that at least in the short-term, constraints on vaccine supply and access are more likely to bind than those on demand.
Link to paper here.
Why Don't Partisans Sanction Electoral Malpractice? 2023
British Journal of Political Science 53(2):407-423.
Partisans rarely punish their party at the polls for violating democratic norms or cheating in elections. However, we know little about the underlying reasons. I examine why partisans rarely sanction in-party malpractice. Using pre-registered survey experiments in Denmark and Mexico, I examine the different steps in how partisans adjust their views in response to revelations of electoral malpractice and distinguish between two substantively different explanations. Do pervasive biases prevent partisans from viewing in-party malpractice as illegitimate? Or, do partisans accurately update their views when learning about malpractice but refrain from voting against their party? The analysis demonstrates that partisans do not apply double standards when evaluating malpractice. However, although partisans punish in-party malpractice, they hold opposing parties in such low esteem that even revelations of malpractice do not change their minds. These findings contribute to our understanding of how partisans think about electoral malpractice and political malfeasance more broadly.
Link to paper here.
Contact me [lfaa@ps.au.dk] for paper drafts
"How Violations of Electoral Integrity Undermine Partisan Loyalty"
[invited to revise and resubmit]
Electoral integrity has come under increasing pressure in established democracies, yet we know little about when citizens tolerate or condemn efforts to subvert elections. Discouragingly, recent work suggests that voters may tolerate -- or even endorse -- violations of democratic rules and norms if it benefits their `team', raising concerns about the stability of American democracy. This article uses three novel survey experiments to study the American public's responses to revelations of election cheating. The results show that partisans do not disapprove disproportionately of cheating by opponents and that even relatively subtle forms of election cheating by the individuals' party reduce their sense of partisan attachment. At the same time, blatant cheating by the in-party leads voters to report more favorable views of the out-party. However, voters only update their partisan loyalties when the information is sponsored by a co-partisan media source, highlighting the importance of credible linkage institutions.
"Do Group-Based Inequalities Feel More Unjust? Experimental Evidence from Economically Disadvantaged Groups in India, South Africa, and the United States"
[under review] with Lasse E. Leipziger and Matias E. Christensen
Macrolevel research find that interethnic inequalities are more likely than interpersonal inequalities to spark political conflict and instability. However, the individual-level mechanisms driving this relationship remain empirically underexamined. We test the central hypothesis that group-based disparities evoke stronger feelings and perceptions of injustice than interpersonal inequalities. Drawing on three preregistered priming experiments among disadvantaged groups in India (n = 1,600), South Africa (n = 1,600), and the United States (n = 3,000), we find limited evidence that intergroup inequality is perceived as more unfair and evokes stronger feelings of injustice than interpersonal inequality. Our findings challenge a prevalent assumption of grievance-based theories and underscore the need for more systematic micro-level investigation.
"The Adverse Effect of Electoral Campaigning for Women Candidates: Evidence from Malawi"
with Merete B. Seeberg
Women remain underrepresented in elected office despite growing evidence that voters often prefer women candidates to men. We argue that understanding demand-side obstacles to women’s access to office requires looking beyond voters' baseline preferences to examine how voters evaluate the behaviors that constitute politics in practice. Using a preregistered survey experiment in Malawi (N = 2,400), we randomize candidate gender and four prevalent campaign strategies in audiovisual vignettes. Consistent with prior work, women enjoy a baseline advantage in electoral support and perceived credibility. However, campaign activities that enhance voters' candidate evaluations disproportionately benefit men, while strategies that undermine such evaluations harm women more. These findings demonstrate how subtle, gendered interpretations of campaign behavior can reinforce barriers to office—even where baseline voter preferences favor women.
"Internalized Power: What Political Elites Believe About Opposing Donald J. Trump"
with Kristian V. S. Frederiksen and Martin Bisgaard
Why do political elites not oppose Donald J. Trump despite his numerous violations of democratic norms? Existing literature typically examines elite incentives externally - whether elites who dissent are punished in fact. We focus instead on internalized beliefs: what elites think will happen if they break with the leader. Using original survey data on U.S. state legislators, local officials, and congressional challengers collected during the 2024 primary elections (N = 1,596), we study what elites thought would happen if a congressional candidate opposed Trump. We find that elites anticipated that breaking with Trump would be extremely costly. Using textual responses, we further show that elites have internalized a narrative that closely resembles what Trump attempts to demonstrate publicly: prompt retaliation from Trump and an unwavering party base make defection prohibitively costly. Our findings underscore the need to better understand how undemocratic leaders are able to shape elite incentives by putting their power on display.
"In-Group Metaperceptions and Support for Democracy", with Lea Pradella and Kristian V. S. Frederiksen